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ABSTRACT
This article explores the problem of attribution in the context of
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) intervention through an analysis of
the Syrian chemical weapons attack of 2013. We argue that R2P
advocates can be confronted by a crisis dynamic where the
political momentum for military intervention runs ahead of
independent verification and attribution of mass atrocity crimes.
We contrast the political momentum for intervention with the
technical process of independent attribution and show that the
sort of independent evidence that would ideally legitimize an R2P
intervention was unavailable when there was political momentum
for action. Conversely, the information that was available (which
inevitably informed the political momentum for action) was
largely produced by state intelligence organizations – or a
potentially briefed media – and shaped by the interests and
priorities of its end users. While understandable in the face of the
‘extreme’, we suggest that the mobilization of political
momentum by R2P advocates entails significant dangers: first, it
risks undermining the integrity of R2P if evidence is later
discredited and second, it risks amplifying the perception that
states sometimes exploit humanitarian pretexts in pursuit of other
strategic ends.
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The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has been a prominent and sometimes controversial
feature of both academic and policy-oriented debates for more than a decade. At times,
it has seemed as if encounters between R2P advocates and critics have generated more
heat than light and that their differences are more irreconcilable than ever. This is no
doubt because both advocates and critics are motivated by a genuine attempt to
prevent extreme violence directed towards civilians. On the one side, R2P advocates are
compelled by the horrific circumstances of mass atrocity crimes, such as those that
occurred in Rwanda and Srebrenica, as well as more recently in Libya and Syria. On the
other side, critics are compelled by a concern that the idea of R2P might be exploited
by states as a pretext for politico-strategic objectives, which can escalate, sustain or
give rise to further violence. In other words, the debate largely concerns how best to
reconcile the normative and political content of R2P.
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In this article, we attempt to draw a line through this debate by closely examining the
discourse that surrounded the Syrian chemical weapons attacks of 2013.1 This is a particu-
larly useful case for three reasons. First, the issue of chemical weapons explicitly draws
security and humanitarian imperatives into the same discursive space – a dynamic cap-
tured in the IR literature on the ‘chemical weapons taboo’.2 Second, the framing of chemi-
cal weapons as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) has served to politicize both their
actual and potential use, particularly since the 2003 Iraq War. Third, the attribution of
the chemical weapons attack was contested in ways that reflected the geopolitical struc-
ture of the Syrian conflict. Together, these dynamics make this a useful case for investi-
gating the intersection of political and normative imperatives around R2P.3
We argue that R2P advocates can be confronted by a crisis dynamic where the political
momentum for military intervention runs ahead of independent verification and attribu-
tion of mass atrocity crimes. We analyse the political discourse after the Syrian chemical
weapons attack and highlight the way many advocates called for R2P intervention, with
the proviso that the role of the Syrian government was proven. We then contrast the
momentum for intervention with the technical process of independent attribution
carried out by the United Nations (UN) Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW). We show that the sort of independent evidence that would ideally legit-
imize an R2P intervention was unavailable when there was political momentum for action.
Conversely, the information that was available (which inevitably informed the political
momentum for action) was largely produced by state intelligence organizations – or a
potentially briefed media – and shaped by the interests and priorities of its end users.
While understandable in the face of the ‘extreme’, we suggest that the mobilization of pol-
itical momentum by R2P advocates entails significant dangers: first, it risks undermining
the integrity of R2P if evidence is later discredited and second, it risks amplifying the per-
ception that states sometimes exploit humanitarian pretexts in pursuit of other strategic
ends.
1This collaboration was born out of a desire for dialogue on humanitarian intervention that reaches across sub-disciplinary
boundaries – in this case, security/International Relations (IR) theory (Tim Aistrope), R2P/UN (Jess Gifkins), and arms
control and disarmament (N.A.J. Taylor). For an earlier discussion of the Syrian crisis that sparked this conversation,
see N.A.J. Taylor, ‘Responsibly Protecting Syrians’, Iraq War Inquiry Group, May 13, 2013, http://iraqwarinquiry.
blogspot.com.au/2013/08/responsibly-protecting-syrians.html (accessed August 2013); and Tim Aistrope, Jess Gifkins,
and N.A.J. Taylor, ‘Responsibly Protecting Syrians: Reconciling R2P with the Chemical Weapons Taboo’, Oceanic Confer-
ence on International Studies, University of Queensland, July 5, 2016. Throughout this process we received generous
feedback that improved the article significantly. In particular, we would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers,
as well as Tony Burke, Deane-Peter Baker, Peter Balint, Toni Erskine, Luke Glanville, Anna Tanascosa, Sarah Teitt and
Ramesh Thakur. We are also very grateful to the International Ethics Research Group hosted by UNSW Canberra to
which an earlier version of the article was presented.
2Richard Price, ‘A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo’, International Organization 49, no. 1 (1995): 73–3; Richard
Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Richard Price, ‘No Strike, No Problem’,
Foreign Affairs, September 5, 2013, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2013-09-05/no-strike-no-problem;
Richard Price, ‘How Chemical Weapons Became Taboo’, Foreign Affairs, December 16, 2015, https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2013-01-22/how-chemical-weapons-became-taboo.
3The article also contributes to critical engagements with the role of security intelligence and WMD politics underway at the
Harvard Sussex Program. For discussion, see Julian Perry Robinson, ‘Alleged Chemical Weapons Use in Syria’, Issue 4,
Occasional Paper Series (Harvard Sussex Program, 2013); Caitriona McLeish, James Revill, and Julian Philip Perry Robinson,
‘Some Potential Implications for the Chemical Weapons Regime Resulting from the Syria Case’, Reports and working
papers (Harvard Sussex Program, 2016), http://srodev.sussex.ac.uk/61837/; James Revill, Alex Ghionis, Caitriona
McLeish, and Steve Johnson, ‘Ghouta Narratives: A Critical Assessment of Syrian Chemical Weapons Narratives’,
Reports and working papers (Harvard Sussex Program, 2016), http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/61840/. Other critical engagements
that are no less useful but with less direct applicability to the present inquiry are available in related programs in the UK
(e.g. at Bath, Bradford, Kings College London), and in Belgium.
2 T. AISTROPE ET AL.
In order to make this case, the first section begins by outlining the various claims
made about the Syrian chemical weapons incident of 2013. The second section
explores the dangers of mobilizing political momentum by examining the reliability
of evidence provided by states to make the case for military interventions. We do
this via an analysis of ‘intelligence’, which is an information product that makes prob-
abilistic estimates about current events and possible futures. We then show that crisis
dynamics can incentivize information emanating from states over and above indepen-
dent attribution. Section three assesses the significance of these insights for the R2P
project and identifies some practices that are particularly vulnerable to these crisis
dynamics.
However, before we proceed we must first establish the scope of this article, which
includes what we mean by ‘R2P’. Our understanding of R2P draws from the version that
was agreed by national leaders in the 2005 World Summit outcome document. Here
they were clear that R2P is concerned with four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.4 As such, former UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon described it as ‘narrow but deep’.5 What this means is that R2P is
not synonymous with humanitarian intervention, but encompasses questions as wide-
ranging as inclusive governance and strengthening domestic resilience, which can be
effective in militating against such crimes.6 This article discusses the coercive (and conten-
tious) elements of R2P, but we start from the understanding that this is only one aspect of
what R2P involves.
It can be helpful then to conceptualize R2P as three pillars – a frame used by the UN
and by most R2P literature currently. The first pillar requires states to protect their own
populations from mass atrocity crimes and applies to all states. The second pillar envi-
sages a cooperative relationship between states and relevant neighbours, regional
organizations and international organizations, whereby states are assisted in providing
protection to their peoples.7 Pillar three can involve consensual tools8 such as
mediation, peacebuilding and unarmed civilian peacekeeping9, as well as coercive
tools such as sanctions and peace enforcement where states have ‘manifestly failed’
to provide such protection. Unsurprisingly, pillars one and two are less contentious
as they presume only consensual actions. We understand R2P as a spectrum of activi-
ties and tools, aimed at preventing and responding to mass atrocity crimes, which can
include both consensual and coercive elements. R2P does not equate to humanitarian
intervention, despite some who argue that the primary focus of R2P is or should be
4United Nations, World Summit outcome document (United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/60/1, 2005).
5Ban Ki-moon, ‘Secretary-General Defends, Clarifies “Responsibility to Protect” at event on ‘Responsible Sovereignty: Inter-
national Cooperation for a Changed World’, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm11701.doc.htm (Berlin,
2008).
6Stephen McLoughlin, The Structural Prevention of Mass Atrocities: Understanding Risk and Resilience (Abingdon: Routledge,
2014).
7For discussion on pillar two, see Adrian Gallagher, ‘The Promise of Pillar II: Analysing International Assistance Under the
Responsibility to Protect’, International Affairs 91, no. 6 (2015): 1259–75.
8For discussion on the peaceful components of pillar three, see Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The First Response: Peaceful Means in the
Third Pillar of the Responsibility to Protect’ (Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis, December, 2015).
9For discussion on unarmed civilian peacekeeping see Ellen Furnari, Huibert Oldenhuis and Rachel Julian, ‘Securing Space
for Local Peacebuilding: The Role of International and National Civilian Peacekeepers’, Peacebuilding 3, no. 3 (2015): 297–
313.
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humanitarian intervention,10 and others who fear that R2P will lead to more use of
humanitarian intervention.11
Given the many concerns of R2P, we deploy a further delineation in the final section of
the essay: ‘policy agenda’ and ‘rallying cry’.12 The ‘policy agenda’ heading refers to the
ideal that effective use of prevention tools will lead to fewer crisis situations that escalate
to the point where humanitarian intervention is considered. The ‘rallying cry’ focuses on
situations where mass atrocity crimes are occurring or foreseeable in the immediate
future, and the idea that labelling a crisis an ‘R2P situation’ can help to elevate it above
politics as usual to garner a quick and decisive response. It is important to recognize
that these categories are not mutually exclusive, but rather reflect different aspects of
the R2P doctrine.
The R2P agreement outlines the requirement that the use of force has authorization
from the UN Security Council: as such the R2P agreement does not change international
law. In cases where R2P is used as a rallying cry towards advocacy for humanitarian inter-
vention the decision – per the R2P agreement – rests with the UN Security Council. The
Council is a political body, requiring agreement from nine of its fifteen members and
the agreement (or abstention) of all permanent members, but with few other formal
restrictions on its decision-making.13 Legitimacy is central to the ability of the Security
Council to wield power.14 As the debates over the Iraq war have demonstrated, credible
evidence is intimately bound up with questions of legitimacy over decisions on the use
of force. Though evidence is not a legal requirement for a UN Security Council decision
(agreement between members is key), we suggest that any proposal for R2P intervention
needs to give credible evidence and reasons that justify that course of action.15
Analysing the 2013 calls for intervention
We begin by outlining the response from the R2P community to the use of chemical
weapons in Syria in August 2013, which were described as a ‘game-changer’ by some
key R2P advocates.16 It is first useful to establish the political landscape in which this
response took place. One of the most notable factors was the public statements of the
Obama administration, which adopted a two-pronged strategy of simultaneously
10Aidan Hehir, The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention (Basingstoke and
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Thomas G. Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crises and the Respon-
sibility to Protect, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 200–1.
11Philip Cunliffe, ‘Sovereignty and the Politics of Responsibility’, in Politics without Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary
International Relations, ed. Christopher J. Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe, and Alexander Gourevitch (Oxon: University College
London Press, 2007), 39–57.
12Eli Stamnes, ‘“Speaking R2P” and the Prevention of Mass Atrocities’, Global Responsibility to Protect 1, no. 1 (2009): 70–89;
Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect – Five Years On’, Ethics and International Affairs 24, no. 2 (2010): 143–69.
13The UN Security Council is bound by the UN Charter (1945) and its Rules of Procedure which remain ‘provisional’.
14Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2007).
15For discussion on this point, see Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Strengthening Security Council Accountability for Sanctions:
The Role of International Responsibility’, Journal of Conflict & Security Law 19, no. 3 (2014): 409–26.
16Gareth Evans, ‘R2P down by not out after Libya and Syria’, Open Democracy, September 9, 2013; Weiss ‘After Syria,
Whither R2P?’, E-International Relations, February 2, 2014, 36. We use the term R2P advocates throughout in its broadest
possible sense, recognizing of course the plurality of perspectives and approaches that inform R2P advocacy. For instance,
in sharing our paper at conferences and other forums, one interlocutor was apt to point out that the Foreword to the
2011 ICISS Report detailed the main points of division between the 12 Commissioners. See ICISS, The Responsibility to
Protect: The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Develop-
ment Research Centre, 2010).
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imposing a so-called red line on the deployment of chemical weapons by the Syrian
regime (formally issued by the President), as well as the incentive to pre-emptively
disarm Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile to avoid military repercussions (informally
tabled by the foreign secretary). For instance, speaking at the Whitehouse on August 20
in 2012, Obama was resolute:
We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a
red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being
utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my equation […] We have com-
municated in no uncertain terms with every player in the region that that’s a red line for us and
that there would be enormous consequences if we start seeing movement on the chemical
weapons front or the use of chemical weapons. That would change my calculations
significantly.17
While condemnation of any possible use of chemical weapons was to be expected, the
response suggested by Obama would require evidence of who was ultimately responsible
based on a verified, independent, expert assessment. As events transpired, Obama did not
enforce the ‘red line’ despite the use of forceful strategic and humanitarian arguments.
Indeed, a complex set of factors both domestically and internationally combined so that
those ends came about by different means. For instance, despite the Cameron govern-
ment’s arguments for military intervention, the deliberations in the British parliament
did not ultimately support that policy, in large part because of heavy reliance in the
Joint Intelligence Committee briefing on ‘intelligence reports plus diplomatic and open
sources’.18 In other words, there was a gap that need closing between what was known
(via robust evidence) and what was merely presumed. At the same time, the Obama
administration remained unsure about both the appetite of the Congress to sanction
any such military action (especially in light of Britain’s stance), as well as the likely
impact it would have on the Iran nuclear deal being negotiated at the time. Former sec-
retary of defence Leon Panetta, for example, has subsequently told The Atlantic that he
‘didn’t know it was coming’.19
The relevance of R2P to the conflict in Syria was clear long before August 2013. The UN’s
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic documen-
ted concerns that violence in Syria since March 2011 may constitute crimes against
humanity.20 From August 2012, the Commission added to its regular reports that it had
reasonable evidence that war crimes had also been committed.21 The Commission even
stated explicitly that ‘The Government has manifestly failed in its responsibility to
protect its people’, drawing on language on R2P from the World Summit outcome docu-
ment.22 The perpetration of mass atrocity crimes is not a ‘threshold criteria’ for the appli-
cability of the R2P – indeed the 2005 World Summit is clear that the scope of R2P includes
17Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps’, White House, August 20, 2012,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps.
18Jon Day, ‘Syria: Reported Chemical Weapons Use – Letter from the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee’, Cabinet
Office, August 29, 2013, 1.
19Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Day Obama Broke with the Washington War Hawks’, The Atlantic, April 2016, http://www.
theatlantic.com/video/index/473025/syria-red-line-that-wasnt/.
20United Nations, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, Human
Rights Council, November 23, 2011. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1: 20.
21United Nations, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, Human
Rights Council, August 16, 2012. A/HRC/21/50.
22Ibid., 1.
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the prevention of such crimes. However, since some commentary behaved as if evidence
of the perpetration of mass atrocity crimes was a criterion – and such evidence is key to
perceptions of legitimacy – it is worth recognizing that the evidence of both crimes against
humanity and war crimes was available long before August 2013. The scale of these crimes
was such that a month prior to the chemical weapons attack the Commission reported
that ‘[w]ar crimes and crimes against humanity have become a daily reality in the
country’.23 By August, more than 100,000 people had been killed in Syria since the conflict
began.24
There was no doubt that the situation in Syria fits within the purview of R2P, including
pillar three of R2P, with the Syrian government ‘manifestly failing’ to protect their popu-
lation from war crimes and crimes against humanity. The R2P agreement is clear,
however, that while coercive measures – including the use of force – can be used, it
requires authorization from the UN Security Council, in line with the UN Charter.
Despite this, media discussion on Syria shifted after the chemical weapons attacks, and
became more likely to refer to the R2P. For example, in the three months leading up to the
attack on 21 August 2013 there were less than 100 news articles on Syria which referred to
the R2P, yet in the three months after there were over 400 news articles which drew the
connection.25 In fact, the year 2013 had more newspaper discussion on the connection
between Syria and R2P than any other year to date, with 1172 articles in total, half of
which referred to chemical weapons.26 This shows a shift in media discussion of Syria in
relation to R2P, beyond the specific statements made by R2P advocates.
In addition to the general media increase in discussions linking Syria and R2P, promi-
nent R2P advocates made the argument that military intervention could be an appropriate
response provided the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government could be
proven. Lloyd Axworthy and Allan Rock made a strong argument that ‘R2P can and
should be used as the basis for action in Syria’; however, this was caveated by their require-
ment that attribution of the Syrian government using chemical weapons be established
first.27 After the chemical weapons attack Gareth Evans laid out a moral argument for
taking military action against the Syrian government if indeed it had used chemical
weapons.28 It is worth pointing out that these three figures are not merely commentators
on R2P. Each played key roles in the creation and formalization of R2P. Axworthy initiated
the original Commission which developed the R2P in his former role as Canada’s Foreign
Affairs Minister; Rock was Canada’s Ambassador to the UN during the 2005 World Summit
negotiations; and Evans was Co-Chair of the original Commission. The important point
here is that these significant R2P advocates saw the use of chemical weapons as a decisive
23United Nations, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, Human
Rights Council, July 18, 2013. A/HRC/23/58: 2.
24‘Syria Death Toll now above 100,000, Says UN Chief Ban’, BBC, July 25, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
east-23455760.
25A Factiva search of news articles with the search terms ‘Syria’ and ‘responsibility to protect’ between 21 May 2013 and 21
November 2013 returned 530 original articles. Of these, 96 were prior to the 21 August chemical weapons attacks and
434 were after. This search was limited to English language news sources.
26A Factiva search of news articles by year shows 1171 articles in 2013 that referred to both Syria and the responsibility to
protect, with an average of 777 per year in the subsequent 2014–2016 period.
27Lloyd Axworthy and Allan Rock, ‘Looking Back at Kosovo Can Move the Syria Conflict Forward’, The Globe and Mail, August
26, 2013.
28Gareth Evans, ‘R2P Down but not Out After Libya and Syria’, Open Democracy, September 9, 2013. https://www.
opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/gareth-evans/r2p-down-but-not-out-after-libya-and-syria.
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event that made intervention a necessity so long as there was proof that the Syrian gov-
ernment was the perpetrator.
Of course, the attribution of the chemical weapons attack intersected with the political
realities of the time. Prior to the chemical weapons attack there was little momentum for
military intervention in Syria, whereas afterwards there was a period where several states
and regional actors pushed for the use of force. First, the UK, along with other regional
actors opposed to the Assad government, was enthusiastic about a strong military
response.29 The chemical weapons attack was positioned as casus belli for intervention.
At the same time, the Obama Administration initially sought to avoid direct military
engagement in another Middle East crisis and pushed back against reports of chemical
weapons use, questioning attribution to forestall further involvement – before shifting
towards intervention under political pressure from allies and domestic partisans.30 Mean-
while, states supportive of the Assad government – notably Russia and Iran – questioned
the origins of the chemical weapons attacks and identified the Islamic State as an alterna-
tive perpetrator, pointing to their alleged use of chemical weapons earlier in the conflict.
These states were quick to dismiss the humanitarian dimension of the crisis and framed
such claims as a convenient pretext for western intervention.31
The point here is that advocacy for R2P intervention arose in a broader geopolitical
context that had the potential to influence information about the chemical weapons
attacks. R2P advocates may have wanted proof that the Syrian government was the perpe-
trator, but the evidence of attribution available in the crisis moment, as the momentum for
intervention gained pace, was potentially problematic. Moreover, these advocates faced
strong incentives to take this information seriously, when the case for intervention made
by states combined strategic arguments about deterrence and regional stability with huma-
nitarian arguments that connected with the concerns of R2P. Indeed, as we indicated above,
the language of R2P was already widely operative in media coverage and political commen-
tary on the chemical weapons attack, often woven together with confident assertions that
the Assad government was to blame for the attacks.32 The next section explores the way pol-
itical dynamics can shape information provided by state intelligence agencies and themedia,
then contrast this with the technical process of independent attribution. In this context, we
suggest R2P advocates needed to take seriously the question of what counts as proof.
Intelligence, attribution and R2P intervention
Numerous sources feed into public perception of international crisis. While reporters ‘on
the ground’ play an important role, by far the most common channel of information
29Geraint Alun Hughes, ‘Syria and the Perils of Proxy Warfare’, Small Wars & Insurgency, 25, no. 3 (2014): 522–38.
30Michelle Bentley, Syria and the Chemical Weapons Taboo: Exploiting the Forbidden (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 2016); Bentley, ‘Chemical Weapons Are Being Used in Iraq – But the US Won’t Raise Hell About It’, The Conversation,
September 23, 2016. https://theconversation.com/chemical-weapons-are-being- used-in-iraq-but-the-us-wont-raise-hell-
about-it-65914. Even when the Obama Administration changed tack on intervention, they sought political cover and
public sanction by putting the proposal before Congress, rather than relying on executive powers.
31Carroll Bogert, ‘Syria’s Chemical Weapons: The Russia Factor’, Human Rights Watch, September 26, 2013. http://www.hrw.
org/news/2013/09/26/syrias-chemical-weapons-russia-factor; Putin, ‘A Plea for Caution from Russia’, New York Times, Sep-
tember 11, 2013.
32At the same time, there was a widespread assumption that independent attribution would confirm the Assad regime was
behind the attacks. It is certainly the case that any R2P proposal for intervention in Syria was only, at this stage of the
conflict, intended to protect Syrian civilians from the Syrian government.
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about an international crisis comes from governments. We focus on the special character
of ‘intelligence’ the chief source of information emanating from states to illustrate the way
national interest imperatives intersect with the representation of the crisis like the Syrian
chemical weapons attack.
The starting point for any account of intelligence should be to note that it is geared
towards future action and is in that sense concerned with risk management. Faced with
an uncertain and often incoherent environment, including enemies that conceal their
activities and intentions, and actively seek to mislead, intelligence analysts can only
hope to produce ‘estimates’ or ‘assessments’ of likely futures, couched in well-rehearsed
caveats about probability and inherent limitations.33 Following on from here, it is crucial
to recognize that the subjects of intelligence estimates are determined by the risks they
may pose to a specific set of interests. Thus, intelligence must be understood as ‘a
system of knowledge in the service of power’.34 It answers questions that are of
concern to policy-makers and political leaders, the end users of intelligence; the priorities
and predispositions of users can influence the way these questions are answered, in terms
of emphasis and priority; whatever intelligence is produced will be mobilized towards the
user’s strategic ends.35 In this sense, even impartial evidence and informed decision-
making is thoroughly structured by national interest imperatives.
These structuring interests become much more explicit and influential around the jus-
tification of the use of force. As Bruce Berkowitz noted on the eve of Colin Powell’s now
notorious presentation to the UN on Iraqi WMD, intelligence is sometimes presented as
fact – a ‘slam dunk’ or a ‘smoking gun’ – to strengthen the credibility of a political
claim.36 Paul H. Barratt, former Secretary of the Australian Department of Defence,
makes the same point regarding the Howard government’s assertions about Iraqi WMDs:
The use of the phrase ‘the Australian government knows’ was a cardinal sin from the view-
point of both Australian parliamentary procedure and professionalism in the treatment of
intelligence. It admits of no doubt – this was not just an assessment, the best judgment we
could make with the available evidence at the time, it was knowledge. We should not
expect a subsequent inquiry to find that evidence was ‘thin, ambiguous, and incomplete’,
which was the finding of the inquiry led by former DFAT Secretary Philip Flood.37
The point here is that because intelligence is always structured by the interest of its end
users, there is real potential for it to be mobilized towards broader strategic ends in ways
that misrepresent the underlying estimate. A similar perspective on the Iraqi WMD case is
given by Richard K. Betts, an eminent scholar of intelligence theory and practice:
Although the bottom line analytic conclusion was wrong, in the absence of adequate collec-
tion it was the proper estimate to make from the intelligence available. No responsible analyst
could have concluded in 2002 that Iraq did not have stocks of chemical and biological
weapons concealed. The principle mistake was in the confident presentation of the analysis
33Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 2007); Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Evidence to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006); Richard
L. Russell, Sharpening Strategic Intelligence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
34James Der Derian, ‘Anti-diplomacy, Intelligence Theory and Surveillance Practice’, Intelligence and National Security 8, no.
3 (1993): 35.
35Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 66–103; Lowenthal, Intelligence, 174–89.
36Bruce Berkowitz, ‘The Big Difference Between Intelligence and Evidence’, Washington Post, February 2, 2003.
37Paul H. Barratt, ‘The Case for an Iraq War Inquiry Global Change’, Global Change, Peace and Security 26, no. 3 (2014): 333.
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and the failure to make clear how weak the direct evidence was for reaching any conclusion
and how much the conclusion depended on the logic of deduction from behaviour.38
Of course, what Betts leaves out here is that intelligence agencies were placed under
enormous pressure by Bush Administration policy makers to produce estimates in
support of a certain policy ambitions. In this sense, there was a relationship between
the strength of the estimates about Iraqi WMDs and the political context in which those
assessments were made. More broadly, the leaked Downing Street Memo, minutes of a
top level British Government meeting in July 2002, indicates: ‘that the intelligence and
facts were being fixed around the policy’.39 Put simply, the decision to change the Iraqi
regime had already been made and WMDs, as well as ancillary humanitarian arguments,
were merely convenient pretexts that could justify the policy to the American public and
the international community. What this episode indicates is the potential for intelligence
to be mobilized towards the strategic ends of states.
As we noted above, another common source of information about international crisis is
media reportage. However, the chemical weapons issue should remind us of how unreli-
able the media has been around WMDs.40 For instance, in the lead up to the Iraq War in
2003, New York Times reporter Judith Miller published a series of articles asserting that Iraq
had WMD and an ongoing active programme to produce them. It turned out that much of
this reporting was based in private briefings from a senior Bush Administration official who
claimed that there was incontrovertible intelligence to that effect.41 More broadly, the
recent Chilcot Report, the UK government’s inquiry into the Iraq War, makes it clear that
a comprehensive media strategy was an integral part of the push for war.42
To recap then: in the immediate wake of the Syrian chemical weapons incident the UK
and Arab states asserted that the Assad regime was responsible.43 This claim was based in
undisclosed intelligence, the authority of which was mobilized publicly in tandem with
emotionally charged images of Syrians dead or dying from exposure to chemical
agents. At the same time, the provenance of the chemical weapons attacks was
muddied by competing claims made by other states, for instance, from Russia and
Syria, as well as journalists, foreign affairs analyst and the various non-state actors on
the Syrian battlefield.44 R2P advocates making the case for intervention were put in a pos-
ition where the information immediately available was provided by self-interested states
and a potentially briefed media, both with a recent history of unreliability around WMD.
By contrast, the sort of robust independent evidence that would ideally have formed
the basis for determining responsibility for the chemical weapons attacks was unavailable.
This is largely because chemical weapons experts establish attribution through rigorous,
38Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 115.
39Mark Danner, ‘The Secret Way to War’, New York Review of Books 52, no. 10 (2005).
40Perhaps the best acknowledgement of this fact is the mea culpa delivered by the New York Times about the failures of its
pre-war coverage, which points to the way government officials exploited reporters to push the case for war. See The
Editors, ‘The Times and Iraq’, New York Times, May 26, 2004.
41Jack Shaffer, ‘The Real Problem with Judith Miller’, Politico, April 10, 2015.
42The Chicot Report advances a broader critique of the case for war, which is scathing in its assessment of the way intelli-
gence was used by government. See ‘The Report of the Iraq War Inquiry’, Report of the Privy Council, 2016. http://
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123122743/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/.
43N.A.J. Taylor, ‘Responsibly Protecting Syrians’, Iraq War Inquiry Group, May 13, 2013, http://iraqwarinquiry.blogspot.com.
au/2013/08/responsibly-protecting-syrians.html (accessed August 2013). As we noted above, the US was more reticent
about attribution initially, a position that aligned with its strategic framework of non-intervention.
44Tim Aistrope, Conspiracy Theory and American Foreign Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 96–7.
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transparent and verifiable methodologies focused on the assessment of technical infor-
mation about the chemical agent and the delivery system in question. There are technical,
practical, legal and political hurdles that can constrain a swift outcome. In the context of
the Syrian chemical weapons attacks, technical constraints on UN inspections include not
only the procurement of evidence, witness accounts and testimony (from medics, for
example), but also the limitations of an interagency process that requires testing in mul-
tiple facilities over the course of several days.45 Practical constraints include the inescap-
able problem that Syria is an active war zone, and UN inspectors must prioritize both their
own personal safety, as well as their mission’s integrity. For instance, the proper handling
of evidence and selection of witnesses is a difficult task during any conflict, whether the
relevant parties comply or not. No one outside of the select few negotiators, likely not
even the UN inspectors themselves, could have been aware what evidence had been sup-
plied by the Syrian Government, opposition force or external actors such as Russia, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, France, UK, US and Israel.
On the politico-legal front, the Assad government’s obligations were also complex and
not altogether as rigid as commonly supposed. Syria was not then a state-party to the
international convention banning the use of chemical weapons, though it is party to
the 1925 Geneva Convention. Assad was under no legal obligation to facilitate inspections
of Syria’s sovereign territory, despite assertions to the contrary based on customary inter-
national law.46 In fact, it was Assad who agreed to the inspections by UN Mission to Inves-
tigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, which had
begun to collect evidence about the use of chemical weapons in Syria only a day before
the attack.47 Both the World Health Organization and OPCW offered assistance to com-
ponents of the UN mission led by Professor Åke Sellström. For instance, the mandated
UN Sellström investigation reported in December 2013 with the narrow conclusion that
‘chemical weapons had been used’ – including against civilians – on five occasions
between March and August 2013, without any attempt to attribute those attacks to any
one party to the conflict.48 It had, however, investigated only 7 of 16 alleged attacks begin-
ning as early as October 2012. Simply put, independent verification of evidence that could
attribute any alleged use to any one party to the conflict would be technically and politi-
cally difficult to establish, and at any rate was never included in the mandate of any sub-
sequent mission by the OPCW-UN or OPCW.49
The point here is that independent reliable evidence on attribution – which R2P advo-
cates might have relied upon instead of state intelligence – was not available and, by its
very nature, could not have been. Moreover, states publicly attributing the use of chemical
weapons to the Syrian government were unwilling or unable to disclose the technical
information that would have allowed independent experts to confirm their attribution.
45J.P. Zanders, ‘Syria: Should the UN Investigators Pass Judgement?’, The Trench, August 23, 2013. http://www.the-trench.
org/syria-should-un-investigators-pass-judgement/.
46Tim Dunne, ‘Syria and the Laws of War: Permission Accomplished?’ The Interpreter, August 27, 2013.
47Indeed, the team was staying in a hotel just twelve kilometres from the incident site.
48United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, Report of
the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013, Report A/68/663, December 13,
2013, 2.
49The reports of the OPCW-UN mission which ceased in September 2014 are collated here: https://opcw.unmissions.org/
other-relevant-documents and https://opcw.unmissions.org/opcw-un-reports. While the reports of the subsequent OPCW
mission are located here: https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/syria/fact-finding-mission-reports/
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According to an advisory opinion from noted chemical weapons specialist J. Perry
Robinson:
Whether the many allegations of Syrian poison-gas warfare are or are not true cannot reason-
ably be judged on the evidence currently in the public domain… [Furthermore] the several
governments which have explicitly accused the Syrian regime of using Sarin nerve-gas
against the rebels seem to be withholding evidence that, if disclosed, might make their
charges more believable than they are. The gap in disclosure is not so much intelligence
from sensitive sources or methodologies but is instead straightforward description for scien-
tific audiences of the procedures that have been used for analysing physiological and environ-
mental samples.50
As it turned out, the public case for military intervention made by the UK and US gov-
ernments did not ultimately withstand high levels of community cynicism about deceptive
intelligence around WMDs and Middle-Eastern wars.
Nevertheless, what all this highlights is the danger faced by R2P advocates making a
case for intervention in a crisis. In the absence of timely independent attribution there
is potential for assumptions based in state intelligence or potentially unreliable media
to be acted on. In such an environment, the reticence and scepticism of expert commu-
nities is liable to be drowned out by the political momentum and the demand for
action. As one chemical weapons specialist, J.P. Zanders sees it:
Instant judgement does not equal instant justice. It merely satisfies other hidden desires: the
dark gratification of being able to Saddam-ise yet another political leader, the clamouring for
policy objectives that have little to do with the chemical attacks as such, the uncontrollable
eagerness to impart wisdom… the need to simplify complex realities for a tweeting global
audience … 51
The point here is that the chemical weapons attacks in Syria indicate a problematic
dynamic. On the one hand, the sort of robust independent evidence that would ideally
form the basis of an R2P case for military intervention is often unavailable when there is
political momentum for action – or indeed when the prospect of further civilian casualties
seems imminent. On the other hand, the information that is available (which inevitably
informs the political momentum for action) is routinely produced by state intelligence ser-
vices – or a briefed media – and shaped by the interests and priorities of its end users.
Although many R2P advocates supported military intervention in Syria on the proviso
that responsibility for the chemical weapons attacks be proven, independent verification
was in reality never a possibility. Put simply, they could not have reasonably known who
committed this heinous act.
This section has explored the implication of crisis dynamics that confront R2P advo-
cates. We have established that intelligence, a key source of information emanating
from states, is implicitly (and on some notable occasions, explicitly) shaped by national
interest, including the policy goals of its end users. We have suggested that this infor-
mation is often the most readily available in crisis situations, especially when independent
verification can involve complicated and time consuming processes. In the final section,
50Julian Perry Robinson, ‘Alleged Chemical Weapons Use in Syria’, Occasional Paper Series: Harvard Sussex Program 4 (2013):
3.
51Zanders, ‘Syria: Should the UN Investigators Pass Judgement?’.
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we explore the potential consequences of this dynamic and offer a word of caution for R2P
advocacy around military intervention.
R2p advocacy and the perception of pretexts
One way to explore the risks associated with unreliable information is situate the different
concerns of R2P in relation to the dynamics of sovereignty in crisis circumstances. As we
noted earlier, for our purposes, the concerns of R2P can be usefully delineated under the
headings ‘rallying cry’ and ‘policy agenda’. The former is about ‘speaking R2P’, which is to
say describing a situation as R2P to elevate it within political debates; the later refers to
implementing and mainstreaming the prevention strategies of R2P throughout domestic,
regional and international infrastructure, which may be done with or without describing it
as R2P.52 It is important to reiterate that these categories are not mutually exclusive, but
rather reflect different aspects of the R2P doctrine. Of particular interest here is Bellamy’s
argument that the rallying cry advocacy for R2P-based military intervention has shown
limited effectiveness in changing the underlying political dynamic driving international
responses to a crisis.53 It follows that rallying cry advocacy may only be effective when
the underlying political dynamic are aligned with intervention. Thus, even when states
appear to embrace humanitarian arguments for intervention, there is a significant risk
that their justification and the information that supports it will be rooted in strategic
imperatives.
Relating this situation to the dynamics of sovereignty in crisis circumstances can high-
light the danger for R2P advocates. Two accounts of sovereignty are relevant: de jure sover-
eignty, most familiar to internationalists and cosmopolitans, points to the norms, practices
and social relations that have given meaning to sovereignty over time; de facto Sover-
eignty, most familiar to classical realists and critical legal scholars, points to the ultimate
authority that allows the sovereign to identify a crisis and act decisively to resolve it,
and to make rules but not be bound by them, particularly in exceptional circumstances.54
According to Moses:
[…] while de jure theories of sovereignty find meaning for the term in shared understanding,
practices, legitimacy and recognition, de facto theories find sovereignty in the opposite: at
points of crisis, misunderstanding, lack of recognition, and, most importantly, in the forceful
resolution of these intense political conflicts.55
Of course, these two accounts are not mutually exclusive: they describe the normative
quality and hierarchical character of sovereignty. While sovereignty emerges and is repro-
duced in social contexts that shape identity and possibilities for action, the ultimate auth-
ority of the sovereign in that social context means that norms and regularities that might
52Stamnes, ‘Speaking R2P’; Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect – Five Years On’. It has been argued elsewhere that the
framing of ‘rallying cry’ and ‘policy agenda’ is overly simplistic, as R2P can serve as a ‘catalyst for debate’ that helps to
foreground protection needs, but does not determine a specific course of action (which will depend on multiple norma-
tive, strategic and pragmatic factors) Jennifer Welsh, ‘Norm Contestation and the Responsibility to Protect’, Global
Responsibility to Protect 5, no. 4 (2013): 365–96. We use the distinction here however, as there was an attempt by advo-
cates to link R2P and chemical weapons use in this case as part of a call to action, in line with the ‘rallying cry’ framing.
53Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect – Five Years On’.
54Jeremy Moses, ‘Sovereignty as Irresponsibility: A Realist Critique of the Responsibility to Protect’, Review of International
Studies 39 no. 1 (2013): 113–35.
55Ibid., 22–3.
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bind some actors are much more contestable at the apex of political power. At the same
time, we can point to the way influential assemblages of norms, practices, rules and his-
torical structures shape, constrain and enable the exercise of sovereign power in palpable
ways.
On the above delineation, we can associate R2P with de jure sovereignty, to the extent
that it seeks to impact the legal and normative dimensions of sovereignty. Conversely, we
can associate military intervention with de facto sovereignty, to the extent that it is only
ever at the point of crisis and the ‘forceful resolution of intense political conflicts’ that inter-
vention takes place. Understood this way, the vulnerability of rallying cry advocacy is plain.
In the crisis moment where the use of force is imminent, when de facto sovereignty is most
likely to be enlivened, R2P advocates seek to mobilize the de jure norm of sovereign
responsibility. Thus, advocacy for R2P-based intervention will often coincide with the
powerful assertion of sovereign interest. R2P advocates must therefore be especially
careful to insulate against the perception and possibility of de facto sovereign power
working through international law and humanitarian pretexts.
While understandable in the face of the ‘extreme’, we suggest that the mobilization of
political momentum by R2P advocates – particularly where independent attribution of
mass atrocity crimes is unavailable – will entail two significant dangers. First, it will risk
undermining the integrity of the R2P intervention. Toni Erskine has recently emphasized
the moral imperative of informed decision-making around R2P interventions. Erskine
makes this point as part of a broader engagement with the concept of ‘resultant moral
luck’ – the idea that moral judgement about past events can inadvertently include in
the consideration aspects of chance that were beyond the control of any specific
actor.56 The primary implication of this concept relates to judgments about moral respon-
sibility. However, Erskine extends the analysis to show how it also imposes strong prospec-
tive prudential obligations on moral agents when they make decisions about future
actions:
This variation on resultant luck speaks to considerations of prospective moral responsibility by
reinforcing the imperative to act only when it is possible to offer a fully informed, compelling
justification of the decision to do so, which heeds clear precautionary principles and will with-
stand any result. It also warns of the folly in allowing the morality of a decision to be either
held hostage to – or redeemed by – fortune.57
This analysis suggests there are risks in proceeding with an R2P intervention before
there is robust independent evidence to support that course of action.
Second, R2P advocates would also risk amplifying the perception that states sometimes
exploit humanitarian crisis in pursuit of strategic ends. As Mallavarapu highlights, colonial
legacies already leave some states suspicious of the power imbalances involved in military
intervention for humanitarian purposes, especially when former colonial powers – who
historically justified their initial conquest in moral terms – often lead interventions in
their former colonies.58 Bellamy has contested these neo-imperial arguments on the
56Toni Erskine, ‘Moral Responsibility – And Luck? – In International Relations’, in The Oxford Handbook of International
Theory, ed. Chris Brown and Robyn Eckersley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
57Ibid., 10.
58Siddharth Mallavarapu, ‘Colonialism and the Responsibility to Protect’, in Theorising the Responsibility to Protect, ed.
Ramesh Thakur and William Maley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 305–22. There is a related literature
on the role of non-Western and non-liberal emerging powers in R2P advocacy, see Ramesh Thakur, ‘R2P after Libya and
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grounds that they deny the consistent support for R2P from many states in the Global
South.59 It is certainly the case that African states have shown leadership on R2P as
Article 4(h) of the 2000 Constitutive Act of the African Union includes the right to intervene
in cases of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, predating the 2005 World
Summit agreement. Whatever the case, the R2P community must be on guard against
advocacy that risks undermining the purported impartiality of the R2P doctrine and invit-
ing the perception that states manipulate humanitarian crisis as pretexts in the pursuit of
other policies.
This perception and possibility may be to some extent unavoidable, but that does not
overwhelm R2P as a positive project. Instead, both the risks highlighted above suggest
that values of caution and impartiality must underpin any rallying cry advocacy for R2P-
based intervention. At the same time, it is worth emphasizing that the policy agenda
aspects of R2P comprise the greater part of the R2P project and remain the most promis-
ing avenue for tangible political change. Raising awareness, building early warning
systems, and developing regional and international networks for preventative diplomacy,
can make very significant contributions towards preventing mass atrocity crimes. Our
analysis of the discourse surrounding the Syrian chemical weapons crisis of 2013 indicates
that if the legitimacy of R2P based intervention (and R2Pmore broadly) is to be maintained
there must first – and principally – be reliable and verified evidence.
Conclusion: robust evidence as a precondition for R2P legitimacy
This article set out to explore the tension between the normative and political content of
R2P. We did so by examining the discourse that surrounded the Syrian chemical weapons
attacks of 2013, where humanitarian and security imperatives were drawn together
around the use of chemical weapons, historical experience with WMDs introduced a
level of suspicion concerning politicization, and the attribution of the attack was contested
in ways that reflected the geopolitical structure of the Syrian conflict. We have argued that
R2P advocates can be confronted by crisis dynamics where the political momentum for
military intervention runs ahead of independent and verification of R2P violations. We con-
trasted the character of intelligence and media reportage with the technical process of
independent attribution and demonstrated that the sort of evidence that would ideally
legitimize an R2P intervention was unavailable when there was political momentum for
action. Conversely, the information that was available was largely produced by state intel-
ligence organizations – or a briefed media – and shaped by the interests and priorities of
its end users. In this context, we suggested that the mobilization of political momentum by
R2P advocates entails significant dangers: first, it risks undermining integrity of R2P if evi-
dence is later discredited and second, it risks amplifying the perception and potential
reality that states sometimes exploit humanitarian pretexts in pursuit of other strategic
ends.
Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers’, The Washington Quarterly 36, no. 2 (2013): 61–76; Hardeep Singh Puri, Perilous Inter-
ventions: The Security Council and the Politics of Chaos (New York: Harper Collins, 2016); Oliver Stuenkel, ‘Post-Western
World: How Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order’, Foreign Affairs, February 13, 2017. One reviewer pointed
out the irony that many of these interventions – in Abysinia, Mesapotamia, Manchuria, and Rhodesia, for example –
involved chemical weapons in one way or another.
59Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect: A Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 112–20.
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At a minimum, any case for R2P-based intervention, whether it is advanced by R2P
advocates or states in the context of a UN resolution, needs to be based in robust, impartial
and publicly verifiable evidence. We have suggested that on the issue WMD, this requires
the application of a rigorous and independent attribution process that would not necess-
arily keep pace with an unfolding crisis or the currents of politics. What is particularly strik-
ing in the case we examined is the extent to which the expert community best positioned
to contribute to the attribution process was largely side-lined from the political discourse.
The sort of robust and impartial case that we argue is a necessity would need to be based
not only in a dialogue between expert communities about the facts at hand and the rea-
lities of the attribution process, but also in the public availability of basic technical data
that could be analysed by multiple independent experts.
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